

Tool Aided Proof of properties of avionics programs

Contents

- ▶ **Formal verification techniques**
- ▶ **Formal verification tools for the A380**
- ▶ **Focus on Caveat**
- ▶ **Unit Proving**

Formal verification techniques

- **Abstract Interpretation Based Static Analysis of programs**
- **Deductive methods**
- **Model checking**

- **BUT ALL OF THEM ARE ABSTRACT INTERPRETATION (Cousot and Cousot)**

- **Since the subject is the proof of properties of real programs, we do not consider Model Checking**

Formal verification tools for the A380 (1)

- **aiT for WCET computation**
 - ▶ **Developed by AbsInt (www.absint.com)**
 - ▶ **Abstract Interpretation based; analysis of binary code; Model of the CPU (and chips impacting the timings)**
 - ▶ **First usage on A380**
 - ▶ **DO178B level A**
 - ▶ **Worst Case Execution Time computation of programs running on complex CPU**

- **Stack analyzers for stack consumption computation**
 - ▶ **Developed by AbsInt (www.absint.com)**
 - ▶ **Abstract Interpretation based; analysis of binary code**
 - ▶ **First usage on A380**
 - ▶ **DO178B level A, B and C**
 - ▶ **Tighter maximum stack usage computation**

Formal verification tools for the A380 (2)

- **RTE-ENS : proof of absence of Run Time Errors**
 - ▶ **Developed by ENS (PR, Cousot's team at Ecole normale supérieure de Paris)**
 - ▶ **Abstract Interpretation based (of course); analysis of C code**
 - ▶ **First usage on A380**
 - ▶ **DO178B level A**
 - ▶ **Proof of absence of RTE like division by zero, numerical overflow, out of bounds access to an array**

Formal verification tools for the A380 (3)

- **Fluctuat : precision of Floating-point calculus**
 - **Developed by CEA, the French nuclear research center**
 - **Abstract Interpretation based; analysis of C or assembly code**
 - **First usage on A380**
 - **DO178B level A**
 - **Safe computation of the numerical (rounding) errors introduced by basic operators or input filtering code**

- **Caveat for Unit Proving**
 - **Developed by CEA, the French nuclear research center**
 - **Deductive method; analysis of C code; Weakest Precondition**
 - **First usage on an A380 30.000 loc program**
 - **DO178B Level A**
 - **Verification of Low Level Requirements in replacement of Unit Testing**

Caveat (1)

- **1996 – 1997 (EU funding): First – limited – prototype**
- **1998 : since 1998 Airbus is financially associated to the development (50% of dev. costs) ; the work being done by CEA**
- **1998 – 2001:**
 - ▶ **maturation of Caveat for a complete adaptation to the targeted application**
 - ▶ **Experiments on real code from various applications**
 - ▶ **Special work on the previous generation of the targeted application for being sure that:**
 - **a standard software engineer can use Caveat; answer: YES**
 - **Caveat runs on standard workstation; answer: YES**
 - **Caveat is suitable for the targeted application, i.e., Unit Proving on an A380 code ; answer: YES**
- **Since 2001: the tool is used by the development team**
 - ▶ **First, fine tuning of the tool/method**
 - ▶ **Then: effective usage**

Caveat (2)

- First Order Predicates (1)

- ▶ Boolean operators

- $\neg, \wedge, \vee, \Rightarrow, \Leftrightarrow$

- Examples : $A \wedge B \Rightarrow C ; D \vee \neg E \Leftrightarrow F ;$

- ▶ Relational operators

- $\leq, <, >, \geq, =, \neq$

- they act as Boolean functions

- Exemples : $a \leq 8 ; b > c$

Caveat (3)

- Predicates (2)

- ▶ Arithmetic expressions

- +, -, *, /, * * ;

- Example : $x+y-8 * z$;

- ▶ Quantifiers

- \forall, \exists

- They act as Boolean functions

- Examples: $\forall x \in \text{int. } x \geq 0 \wedge x < 10 \Rightarrow P(x)$;

- $\exists y \in \text{int. } y \geq 0 \wedge y < 10 \wedge P(y)$;

Caveat (4)

- Predicates (3)

- ▶ Examples of predicates:

- $_B_ACS1=1 \Leftrightarrow _CPT_ACS1 \geq 3 \wedge (VACS1' > -9.6 \vee VACS1' < -10.2)$;
 - $a \leq x+y-8 \wedge b > 0 \Rightarrow z=9$;

Caveat (5)

- Caveat's Main function
 - ▶ Proving that a property holds at a certain point of C function
- How ?
 - ▶ Caveat computes the condition which must hold at the beginning of the function for proving that the required property holds; it then tries to prove this condition
 - ▶ Different kinds of properties to be proved:
 - Post-conditions, Asserts, loop invariants, loop variants

Caveat (6)

- Example

```
int Max(int a, int b, int c)
{
    int Max;
    if (a >= b)
        if (a >= c)
            Max=a;
        else
            Max=c;
    else if (b >=c)
        Max=b;
    else
        Max=c;
    return Max;
```

Condition of verification 1 : VRAI

Condition of verification 2 : VRAI

Post P1 : $\text{Max} = a \vee \text{Max} = b \vee \text{Max} = c$;

Post P2 : $\text{Max} \geq a \wedge \text{Max} \geq b \wedge \text{Max} \geq c$;

Caveat (8)

- Simplifier
 - ▶ Simplification of algebraic expressions
- Theorem prover
 - ▶ Notion of Inference rules

APPLICATION TO THE A380 COMPUTER

- Objectives


- ▶ Reduce the cost of software verification without compromising the effectiveness of the verification

- Solution selected

- ▶ Definition of low-level requirements (LLR) using formal properties (design)
- ▶ Unit proof verification supported by the CAVEAT tool, which replaces the unit test activity

APPLICATION TO THE A380 COMPUTER

Formal methods and development cycle



APPLICATION TO THE A380 COMPUTER

Certification aspects

- Assessment process of Caveat by Certification Authorities is currently running
- Issue: for the verification process, DO-178B is prescriptive in term of means (Testing)
- The caveat approach is an alternate means of compliance but C.A assess a process against DO-178B
- Need to go back to the underlying objectives and to show that our approach is compliant with them
- A dedicated Certification Review Item is open to record the ways of addressing the issue
- No adverse comment from C.A against our approach