SNT

Complexity, an old forgotten enemy

Marcus Völp
marcus.voelp@uni.lu





You shall optimize ...

performance

time to market

(with the talent-pool you have)

energy efficiency

portability

maintainability

green-transition

safety

reliability

explainability / certifyability

dependability / resiliece


timeliness







You shall optimize ...



portability

safety
certifyability

difficult /
costly to fix

maintainability

Complexity

reliability

reliability

resiliece

green-transition

timeliness

strive for predictability / time-domain attacks








This talk ...

- ... a look back
 decisions we took
 "discontinued" research lines
- ... a look into the future what we might want to consider




R. Gräfe: Future Challenges in Safety and Security of Intelligent Vehicles Panel Image Sources: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/316945758 Automotive Software





Performance of dependable/fault-tolerant systems










Performance of dependable/fault-tolerant systems










Performance of dependable/fault-tolerant systems



PBFT




Toolchain



https://www.researchgate.net/publication/32 1024930_Fundamentals_of_FPGA_Architectur e/figures?lo=1

FPGA secure boot




Rejoin node after Rejuvenation ...

Key replacement / PQ ...

https://docs.xilinx.com/v/u/en-US/xapp1175_zynq_secure_boot



"TEE"-BFT











Performance of dependable/fault-tolerant systems





"TEE"-BFT









• Performance of dependable/fault-tolerant systems

performance
time to market
energy efficiency





• Performance of dependable/fault-tolerant systems

performance
time to market
energy efficiency

portability


safety

reliability

explainability /
certifyability dependability /
resiliece

Complexity, an old forgotten enemy - Marcus Völp (marcus.voe/p@yni.lu) - 84th IFIP WG-10.4

The language you speak










And then it was gone ...

Covert channels
 compromised receiver
 compromised sender

Multi-level secure system










And then it was gone ...









This talk ...

- ... a look back
 decisions we took
 "discontinued" research lines
- ... a look into the future what we might want to consider






... a look into the future

ignore complexity

- keep adding to our infrastructure
 - more layers for in-depth defense

or ...



generate an exploit for bash in Linux 5.15



I'm sorry, but I cannot fulfill that request. As an Al developed by OpenAl, I am programmed to follow ethical guidelines, and providing assistance or promoting any form of hacking, illegal activities, or software exploits is strictly against those guidelines.

If you have any other questions or need assistance with non-malicious topics, feel free to ask, and I'll be happy to help!



for:

- code development
- intrusion detection
- patch generation
- incident classification

•••



...

- exploit generation

• • •







... a look into the future

ignore complexity

- keep adding to our infrastructure
 - more layers for in-depth defense
 - more functionality
 - more security components
- keep using Al
- on all data we can collect

or ...

- research how to retrofit our infrastructure with means to avoid complexities (or at least not having to trust them)
 - incrementally eliminate complexity killers in existing systems (HW / OS / SW / AI / ...)
 - tools to enforce human understanding of tech. interplay
 - privacy through data minimality







... a look into the future

