Cyber-Physical Intrusion Resilience

Saman Zonouz

Associate Professor, Georgia Tech School of Cybersecurity and Privacy (SCP) School of Electrical and Computer Engineering (ECE)

Grand Challenges for our Community, IFIP Meeting 2023



Outline (focused on resilience/security)



- Important research challenges
- Exciting opportunities for CPS research
- Lessons learned from the past
- Ideas for tech-transfer initiatives
- CPS security education moving forward


Predictive Situational Awareness



- Online monitoring of the CPS operation to identify potential cybersecurity incidents
- Extensive work on transitioning IT-like <u>real-time</u> monitoring solutions to CPS domain (e.g., mount IMUs to monitor the motion)
- Not always useful in practice due to physics momentum and inertia – chase.com vs Tesla
- "Ahead-of-Time alerts" in CPS
 - required to provide time for decision-making on response action selection and its enforcement (potentially in physical components - time-consuming)

JAT Verification [NDSS, ACSAC]






Physics-Aware Software Analysis



- Semantic gap (disconnect) between software concepts and physical process concepts
- Nowadays, software analysis tools completely ignore underlying physical dynamics
 - reverse engineering, vulnerability assessment, hardening (e.g., patching, CFI)
- All algorithmic vulnerabilities are overlooked
 - as opposed to conventional SW vuls (UAF, BoF, ...)
- The potential safety consequences of individual SW vulnerabilities are unknown
 - similarly for attackers, "what value should I overwrite following a heap overflow exploitation?"

Reversing Control Semantics [MobiSys, DSN]





Human-Assisted Intrusion Response



- Existing CPS security focuses on prevention (hardening) and monitoring (attack detection)
 - almost no emphasis on cyber-physical R&R
- Fully automated R&R is too complex
 - selection of optimal response policies including both cyber and physical actuation is even harder
- Promising solutions (e.g., SIEMs) to enable operators to make correct decisions (outage management)
- Next step: human-assisted R&R capabilities
 - provide operators with a list of 'relevant' potential R&R countermeasures for confirmation
 - learning (cost functions) by observing operators passively to imitate "their reasoning" later actively

Domain-Specific AI for Security



- Almost all AI models are optimized for CV and NLP (e.g., ImageNet competitions)
 - not always tuned for non-image process/software data
- Often used blindly for security purposes
 - process data anomaly/attack detection, binary decompilation, code similarity (bug discovery)
- Not serving domain-specific requirements
 - testing data could/should come from a <u>maliciously-designed</u> different attack – lack of robustness
 - e.g., sys-wide anomaly detection w/o diagnostics
- Robustness is a more difficult problem in security
 - malicious players involved with different attack vectors
 - physics-informed neural networks (underlying equations?)

Al-Powered Side Channel Analysis





+ No interference with real-time control


+ Air-gapped detection trusted computing base

+ Hard to mislead due to tamperproof physics laws that generate side signals


[1] Genkin, et al. "ECDSA key extraction from mobile devices via nonintrusive physical side channels." CCS 2016.[2] Nazari, et al. "Eddie: Em-based detection of deviations in program execution." ISCA 2017.







Optimal Chunked Malware Injection (NOT Detected)



Resilience vs (supply chain) Complexity

[IEEE S&P'22]




All components in the S7-1200 firmware were also present in the S7-1500, ET 200SP/pro group of firmware Siemens 2022 controller: release dates of packages in the firmware span from as far back as 2008 Schneider Electric controllers utilize long outdated OpenSSL 0.9.8, more than 6 years past its EOL. On average, a package included in Siemens firmware is 1384 days stale	2022
Vendor Devices Variants Notes Firmware Groups OS base Runtime Binaries Dissection tools Schneider M241 Schneider PLCs do not upgrade jQuery dependencies in their M241 Schneider PLCs do not upgrade jQuery dependencies in their	Components Shared
Electric M251 M258 existing components but instead bundle multiple outdated versions.	4
S7-1200 19 Entry level PLC S7-1200 Utilizes OpenBSD In-house 10 binwalk, Cutter	14
Siemens S7-1500 ET 200SP ET 200Pro 3 Third-party code remarkably increases the attack surface. g, Cutter, g, C	12 720
WAGO PFC200 21 PFC200 21 (2nd generation) 18 Compact and modular PLC WAGO and ABB share seven packages, which take around 13%	298
ABB AC500-V3 AC500-S V3 AC500-S A	55 55
Total 168 48	

Resilience vs Complexity: Simplify!

- (unnecessarily) bloated systems
 - supply chain and third-party contributors
 - abundant data and computational resources
 - e.g., universal PLCs used for specific use-cases
- Complicates assurance generally

 verification and testing/fuzzing
- Debloat first.
 - remove unnecessary parts
- Challenges
 - what is "necessary", or "can" be misused?
 - how to remove the unnecessary parts robustly.





Trustworthiness w/ Untrusted (edge) AI



- Al solutions are getting more complicated
 - e.g., in terms of DNN size, architectural complexity
- "Verified AI" for real-world large models could take time to be practical (industry reluctance)
 - similar to SW verification efforts code bases get more complex while verification solutions improve
- Edge AI for the communication-computation tradeoff
 - less secure (e.g., due to security support/DEP in MCUs)
- Ensure safety for systems including AI modules, which may act wildly
 - top-down system-wide (to detect/ignore suspicious AI)
- Security-oriented DNN debloating/pruning [NeurIPS'21]
 - to simplify verification at the cost of suboptimal control
 - create a verifiable suboptimal small replica (surrogate) of the main optimal controller used for safety monitoring and response

0.5

The actual states visited

become the roots of follows a path through subsequent shallow models

the physical system


the shallow model

Time

Start

DNN-based Controller Surrogate for Intrusion Recovery [RAID, NeurIPS]





Challenge: Make CPS-Sec Education Attractive



"Cybersecurity of Drones", Spring 2023 - assembled/compiled, attacked/defended d ones - six mini-projects including AI/DNN-based control - lots of logistics with GT Police and Insurance • 57% female students They enjoyed building/flying drones 4.9/5.0 end-of-semester course score lakeaway They learned CPS Sect **v**/o noticing

Conclusion

- Predictive Situational Awareness
- Physics-Aware Software Analysis
- Human-Assisted Intrusion Response
- Domain-Specific Al for Security
- Resilience vs Complexity: Simplify.
- Trustworthiness w/ Untrusted (edge) AI
- Make CPS Security edu attractive



Saman Zonouz saman.zonouz@gatech.edu

Thank You!