

RC3: Resilient Computing and Cybersecurity Center





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
Int'l Workshop on Workshop on Cyber Resilient Systems, 4-7th June –Cascais, Portugal




Enter AI, ML, DNN, ...



Hype Cycle for Artificial Intelligence, 2020








Homogeneous ML/DNN-based systems cannot give strong assurance guarantees



- Status-quo
 - Autonomous cars use ML-powered multi-sensor perception and complex control logic, and sometimes redundant modules to which they hand over in case of problems.
- Assurance
 - Infeasible to provide reliable figures/conclusions
 - Impossible to certify under current best practices



Tesla radar did not recognize a camel, causing فللعلوم والتقنية للعلوم والتقنية an accident in the UAE





Can we leverage the best of the security and dependability fields?




- In particular, dependability teaches us that our techniques:
 - (i) should identify the uncertainties and weaknesses exhibited at component level,
 - and (ii) craft mechanisms that address them, to produce predictably correct system-level results.
- Result (ii) always conditioned by how well we did (i)



Hybrid ML-based systems may help an autonomous vehicles ecosystem example



- **Redundancy** these components cooperate redundantly to achieve the end goal of safety
 - Replication
 - Reconfiguration, hand-over
 - Take-over
 - Diversity, for malicious faults
- **Hybrid architecture** Autonomous cars having different realms running under different assumptions
 - Hybrid system and fault assumptions ("hierarchy of functions")
 - Modular
 - Distributed.
- Assurance enablers of the goal
 - Recent Hybrid Logic of Events allows verifying architecturally hybrid systems by proof assistants.
 - Trusted-trustworthy hybrids anchor the global trustworthiness, through proof of the Lifting predicate




proof of concept of hybridisation for safety

- Main Concepts:
 - Level of Service
 - Data validity
 - Safety kernel

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KARYON Workshop, Borås, Sweden, Dec 11, 2014



Karyon Architecture

