

RepuCoin: Your reputation is your power

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
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Reality is tough









In a permissionless blockchain, how to enforce, at least with a very high probability, that

malicious_nodes $\leq F$? ΣP malicious_nodes $\leq P_F$?



RepuCoin Overview



Main problems of PoW:

- Decision (voting) power is CPU power
- Instantaneous power
- can be gained **quickly**;
- vulnerable to flash attacks.

Rationality and maliciousness

- not clearly distinguished

PoW consensus is **probabilistic**

- forkable BC

Low (stochastic) resilience - vulnerable to selfish mining (>25%) and other attacks leveraging instantaneous power

Low Throughput:

- 7 TPS
- 1,000 TPS (ByzCoin)

Our solutions:

Decision (voting) power is reputation

- **Integrated** power (past performance)
- can only grow slowly with bounded rate;
- Not vulnerable to flash attacks.

Rationality and maliciousness

- separate protection measures

PoR consensus is deterministic

- novel weighted voting consensus algorithm
- non-forkable BC

High (stochastic) resilience-Not vulnerable to instantan. power attacks-Non-rationality of infiltration attacks

High Throughput:

- (fast) PoR for committing transactions
- 10,000 TPS (256 Byte per TX)



The logic of RepuCoin in a nutshell

- SIT securityandtrust.lu CRITIX
- reputation-based weighted voting consensus is safe and live as long as relative decision power (given by reputation score) of attackers is below a defined threshold, fraction of the total
- max rate of decision power growth of any system participant is deterministic, bounded and known, imposed by the proof-ofreputation function
- * there is no rational economic model for infiltration attacks --- compared to the cost of attacking different systems
- Attacks attacks on liveness or safety still being possible, the network achieves very high stochastic robustness against them --- i.e., attack effort to reach network control compares very favorably to previous works
- * RepuCoin prevents all currently known attacks.






 Miners gain reputation slowly with a bounded rate by contributing to the blockchain

Algorithm 2 Reputation algorithm

Input: L, $\{k_i\}_{i=1}^t$, $\{m_j\}_{j=1}^{N_l}$, m, c, a, and λ . Output: Reputation $R \in [0, 1]$ of the corresponding miner.







- Miners gain reputation slowly with a bounded rate by contributing to the blockchain
- 2. Top reputed miners dynamically form a consensus committee







- Miners gain reputation slowly with a bounded rate by contributing to the blockchain
- 2. Top reputed miners dynamically form a consensus committee
- The committee votes through reputation-based weighted voting protocol to pin keyblocks;
- 4. A randomly elected leader proposes microblocks to the committee for their approval;

· · · Key	block_hash _i		k	eyblock_hash _{i+1}	\[keyl	$block_hash_{i+2}$	5
prev_	_keyblock_hash	Ч	pre	ev_keyblock_hash	Ч	prev_	_keyblock_hash	۲
	Nonce _i			Nonce _{i+1}			Nonce _{i+2}	
	PK_i			PK_{i+1}			PK_{i+2}	
	R_i		R _{i+1}		R_{i+2}			
	K_sig_i			K_sig_{i+1}			K_sig_{i+2}	
sig_k	eyblock_agmnt _i	si	g_	keyblock_agmnt _{i+1}	V	sig_ke	yblock_agmnt _{i+2}	
	microblock_ha	ush _i		microblock_hash _{i+}	-1		microblock_has	\mathbf{h}_{j+2}
$H(K_sig$		<i>hi</i>)		$H(K_sig_i)$			$H(K_sig_{i+1}$)
	prev_microblock	k_hash		prev_microblock_has	sh		prev_microblock	hash
	TXs M_sig			TXs			TXs	
			M_sig				M_sig	
sig_microblock_agm]	sig_microblock_agm	nt		sig_microblock_a	gmnt





- Miners gain reputation slowly with a bounded rate by contributing to the blockchain
- 2. Top reputed miners dynamically form a consensus committee
- The committee votes through reputation-based weighted voting protocol to pin keyblocks;
- 4. A randomly elected leader proposes microblocks to the committee for their approval;
- 5. Mis-behaved miners will be punished, and they lose reputation







Reputation is your power



- i. **careful start**, through an initial slow increase;
- ii. potential for quick reward of mature participants, through fast increase in mid-life;
- iii. prevention of over-control, by slowincrease near the top













Reputation distribution of miners over time.

Time	[0, 0.2)	[0.2, 0.4)	[0.4, 0.6)	[0.6, 0.8)	[0.8, 1]
1 month	100%	-	-	-	-
6 months	64.7%	35.3%	-	-	-
1 year	21.8%	78.2%	-	-	-
2 years	9.6%	31.7%	38.1%	15.2%	-
3 years	2.7%	21.6%	19.5%	38.1%	15.2%
4 years	2.7%	19.1%	-	25%	53.2%
4 years	2.7%	15.1%	4%	17.9%	60.3%
20 years	0.4%	2.3%	-	3%	94.3%



Reputation is your power

Reputation-based incentives lead miners to work diligently and honestly

A successful miner

- 1. gets all mining rewards
- 2. shares transaction fees with a randomly selected leader, according to the reputation.
- gets >60 times better transaction fees than BTC, due to high throughput

Algorithm 1 Reward sharing algorithm

- **Input:** The sequence $\mathbb{M} = \{m_0, m_1, \dots, m_{n-1}\}$ of microblocks pinned in the (i-1)-th epoch, the signature K_sig_i contained in the *i*-th pinned keyblock, and the reputation R of the miner who created the (i-1)-th keyblock.
- **Output:** Two subsets $\mathbb{M}', \mathbb{M}'' \subseteq \mathbb{M}$ of microblocks, where transaction fees contained in \mathbb{M}' (resp. \mathbb{M}'') are allocated to the miner (resp. the leader) as reward.

```
1: i' = H(K\_sig_i) \mod n

2: k = 0

3: \mathbb{M}' = \emptyset

4: while k < R \cdot n do

5: j = i' + k \mod n

6: \mathbb{M}' = \mathbb{M}' \cup \{m_j\}

7: k = k + 1

8: end while

9: \mathbb{M}'' = \mathbb{M} \setminus \mathbb{M}'
```



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
The increase of any miner's voting power is bounded by "physics"!

$$\frac{dPd}{dN \cdot dt} = \frac{1}{2} \frac{\lambda}{(\lambda + |x - a|)^2} \leq \frac{1}{2\lambda}$$

 λ and *a* are system parameters, and *x* is defined in the reputation algorithm.



RECAP: The logic of RepuCoin in a nutshell





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Security and Dependability:



The minimum cost of successfully attacking RepuCoin

Joining time \ Target	1 week	1 month	3 months	6 months
1 month	infeasible	45%	30%	27%
3 months	infeasible	90%	45%	33%
6 months	infeasible	infeasible	68%	45%
9 months	infeasible	infeasible	90%	54%
12 months	infeasible	infeasible	infeasible	68%
18 months	infeasible	infeasible	infeasible	91%
20 months	infeasible	infeasible	infeasible	infeasible



Security and Dependability:



The minimum cost of successfully attacking RepuCoin

	1	1	1	
Joining time \ Target	1 week	1 month	3 months	6 months
1 month	infeasible	BTC: *635;	BTC: *1271;	BTC: *2287;
		BYZ: *6	BYZ: *11	BYZ: *20
3 months	infeasible	BTC: *1270;	BTC: *1906;	BTC: *2795;
		BYZ: *11	BYZ: *17	BYZ: *25
6 months	infeasible	infeasible	BTC: *2880;	BTC: *3812;
			BYZ: *26	BYZ: *34
9 months	infeasible	infeasible	BTC: *3812;	BTC: *4574;
			BYZ: *34	BYZ: *41
12 months	infeasible	infeasible	infeasible	BTC: *5760;
				BYZ: *51
18 months	infeasible	infeasible	infeasible	BTC: *7708;
				BYZ: *69
20 months	infeasible	infeasible	infeasible	infeasible
	•	•	•	



Comparison



Attacks/Features	BitCoin	BitCoin-NG	ByzCoin	RepuCoin
Double spending attacks			×	×.
Selfish mining attack			1	×.
Bribery/flash attack	1		1	×
Eclipse attacks	1			
Non-forkable chain	1		A.	×
Liveness	R.	×.	1	×
Throughput	7 tps	?	1,000 tps	10,000 tps



The system is secure against this attack



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The system is vulnerable to this attack

The system can prevent double spending, but its throughput maybe reduced.

256 Bytes/TX 13 nodes 1KB/Kblock 2 MB/Mblock



Thank you!



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CRITIX @SnT, Critical and Extreme Security and Dependability

We're hiring bright post-docs and research associates willing to address these challenges!



J.Yu,D.Kozhaya,J.Decouchant,and P.Esteves-Verissimo, "Repucoin: Your reputation is your power," Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2018/239, 2018, <u>https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/239</u>.