


Developing Building Codes for Building Code

IFIP WG 10.4 70th Meeting
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Firefighters vs. Fire Prevention

- There is now a large market of “Cyber Security Jobs” – but it’s mostly a market for firefighters, not engineers
- Security vulnerabilities are engineering defects, not an incurable disease demanding weekly flu shots
- Borrowing the mechanism of building codes could help us reduce these vulnerabilities significantly



The talk on one slide

- We know how to build much better security into systems than we have done
- Reasons for this are many, including
 - Lack of consensus on basic requirements for software construction
 - Difficulty for consumers to specify such requirements or to recognize that a product meets them
- Creating a “building code” for software with security requirements might help establish consensus and enable consumer specification
 - Historical development of building codes
 - Where a building code for software might focus
- Such a code has been drafted for medical device software more than a year ago and is available;
- A coming workshop (Nov. 2016) aims to do the same for power system software. Please help! <http://cybersecurity.ieee.org/building-code/>

Categories of Code Elements

- A. Avoid/detect/remove vulnerabilities at the implementation stage (8 elements)
- B. Assure proper use of cryptography (2 elements)
- C. Assure Software/Firmware Provenance and Integrity (3 elements)
- D. Impede attacker analysis/exploitation (4 elements)
- E. Enable detection/attribution of attack (1 element)

Categories not populated:

- F. Assist in safe degradation of function during an attack
- G. Assist in restoration of function after an attack
- H. Support maintenance of operational software without loss of integrity
- I. Support privacy requirements

From “Sufficient Evidence”*

[About dependable software generally]:

“As is well known to software engineers..., by far the largest class of problems arises from errors made in the eliciting, recording, and analysis of requirements. A second large class arises from poor human factors design...”

[About security vulnerabilities]:

“Security vulnerabilities are to some extent an exception; **the overwhelming majority of security vulnerabilities reported in software products – and exploited to attack [them] – are at the implementation level.** The prevalence of code-related problems, however, is a direct consequence of higher-level decisions to use programming languages, design methods, and libraries that admit these problems. In principle, it is relatively easy to prevent implementation-level attacks but hard to retrofit existing programs.”

**Software for Dependable Systems: Sufficient Evidence?* National Research Council, 2007

References

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CACM Viewpoint

- We Need a Building Code for Building Code. Viewpoint column, Comm. ACM 58, 2 (Feb. 2015), pp. 24-26 .<http://www.landwehr.org/2015-02-cacm-viewpoint-bldg.pdf>

IEEE Cybersecurity Initiative Report: Medical Device Software Building Code

- Building Code for Medical Device Software Security. (with Thomas Haigh). IEEE Computer Society, March, 2015:
- <http://cybersecurity.ieee.org/images/files/images/pdf/building-code-for-medical-device-software-security.pdf>

And website

- <https://sites.google.com/site/bcformdss/>

Call for Participation in Power Software Security Building Code Workshop at UIUC Nov 16-18 2016

<http://cybersecurity.ieee.org/building-code/>