Architecture, Issues and Challenges for Safety Related Autonomous Systems

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Key Drivers: Safety

Evolution of European Road Fatalities (EU-27)

Ensuring Reliable Networks



Source: CARE or national publications; EC Directorate General Energy and Transport December 2009

According to WHO: 50 million injuries in 2010, 1.2 million fatal injuries

Key Drivers: Convenience

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"When I don't feel like driving, I let my car do it for me…"





traffic jams

parking

Quelle: Audi

Goals for Piloted Driving





Examples



















Sensors

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Actuators

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Layered Function Architectur Decoupling from Sensors

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Some Safety Considerations



Driver takes over control

Driver needs some time to be prepared for take-over

- System is no longer fail-safe
- Fail-operational behavior for limited time required

Safe State





Issues: Complexity Management and Integration



Architecture Level

- Observability at the functional Level
 - Essential for integration and diagnostics
- Stabile (deterministic) Integration Behaviour
 - Seamless flow from simulation, prototyping, validition, integration, to release
 - Re-usable and en-richable testcases throughout all pahses
- Robustes behaviour in case of errors \rightarrow recovery
 - Faults are normal

Process Level

Seamless Toolchain

• RM, CM, Test Cases, Issue Tracking,

Observability is key for Integration, Test and Validation





Integration Issue example

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Composability or Stable Integration

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Transparent Bypassing for efficient development cycles





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- Robustness of "bleeding edge" chips
 - Non-automotive qualified chips \rightarrow Robustness validation
 - Safety functions on chips without dedicated safety support → Fault-detection based on application knowledge
- SoS interaction Man / Machine
 - At up to about 50 km/h under typical conditions a car can be stopped by an emergency braking assistant before the driver has started to react
 - Brake or accelerate when overtaking a car: Who is charge man or machine → must not oscillate

Additional Issue: "Safe Object Recognition"



- Pattern recognition based on probabilistics
- Safety Standards (e.g. IEC 61508, ISO 26262) assume
 - Component failures of HW (FIT rates)
 - Design faults (SW + HW)
 - But SW is assumed to be deterministic
- What need to be done to get a "Safe Object Recognition"?
 - Testing?
 - Diverse implementation?
 - (Semi-)Formal Methods?



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Thank you!