

Testing the Timing Robustness of the Functional Software Layer of an Autonomous Robot

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The logo for LAAS-CNRS, featuring the text "LAAS-CNRS" in a blue, sans-serif font. The text is centered between two horizontal bars: a pink bar on top and a yellow bar on the bottom.


LAAS-CNRS

IFIP 10.4 Working Group Meeting, Saint-Luce, Martinique, 26-30 January 2012

Robustness


- **Degree to which system can function correctly in the presence of invalid inputs or stressful environmental conditions [IEEE Std. 610-12, 1990]**
 - **stressful environmental conditions**
 - non-functional stress (e.g., interference, temperature...)
 - functional stress (e.g., load, problem complexity...)
 - **invalid (functional) inputs**
 - invalid in value (e.g., requests with incorrect parameters)
 - invalid in time (e.g., requests at wrong time)

3-Layer Architecture




Input timing robustness

- Capacity of system to react to inputs that are sent at the "wrong" time



Input timing robustness


- Capacity of system to react to inputs that are sent at the "wrong" time



Reaction type 1 : reject input

Input timing robustness


- Capacity of system to react to inputs that are sent at the "wrong" time



Reaction type 2 : queue input

Input timing robustness


- Capacity of system to react to inputs that are sent at the "wrong" time



Reaction type 3 : force state change (e.g., interrupt)

Input timing robustness testing


- Test capacity of system to react to inputs that are sent at the "wrong" time



Input timing robustness properties

Abstract state of the functional layer:

- initial state + history of activities executed to date
- activities being executed now...



→ "Color"?

↓
Set of properties

Input timing robustness properties

Precondition $PC[x, C_{PRE}]$

- start of activity x requires $C_{PRE} = \text{true}$

Exclusive start $ES[x,y]$

- activity x start excluded by ongoing activity y

Exclusive execution $EE[x,y]$

- activity x execution excluded by request for activity y

Exclusion $EX[x,y]$


- activity x excluded by activity y
($EX[x,y] \equiv ES[x,y] \wedge EE[x,y]$)

Mutual exclusion $MX[x,y]$

- activities x and y cannot execute simultaneously

Robustness behavior categories


Precondition $PC[x, C_{PRE}]$ enforced by rejection



True Negative (TN) : no invocation of property enforcement, since execution of request is **authorized**

Robustness behavior categories


Precondition $PC[x, C_{PRE}]$ enforced by rejection



True Positive (TP) : invocation of property enforcement (rejection), since execution of request is *not authorized*

Robustness behavior categories


Precondition $PC[x, C_{PRE}]$ enforced by rejection



False Negative (FN) : no invocation of property enforcement, yet execution of request is *not authorized*

Robustness behavior categories

Precondition $PC[x, C_{PRE}]$ enforced by rejection





False Positive (FP) : invocation of property enforcement (rejection), but execution of request is *authorized*


Black-box robustness testing

- 🕒 Testing at the interface, with no access to internals of system under test

😊 Enables comparison of different SUTs (with same interface)



Oracle for property $PC[x, C_{PRE}]$



Oracle for property $PC[x, C_{PRE}]$

Some notation

Correct
termination


Interruption to
enforce P

Rejection to
enforce P

ok

z_p

r_p



T_x

Z_x

R_x

Termination

Interruption (zap)

Rejection




final reply $f_x(i)$



Oracle for property $PC[x, C_{PRE}]$


Example: $C_{PRE} =$ activity Q successfully completed

$$C_{PRE}(x(i)) = \exists f_q(k), [t(f_q(k)) < t(x(i))] \wedge [f_q(k) = \text{ok}]$$





		$f_x(i)$			
		$\in \{Z_x, T_x\}$	r_P	$\in R_x \setminus r_P$	\emptyset
$C_{PRE}(x(i))$	true	TN	FP	OP (other positive)	w
	false	FN	TP		

Oracle types



Case study: the Dala rover





module	request	request type
Antenna	init	init
-	communicate ¹	exec
Sick	init	init
-	reset	exec
-	oneshoot	exec
-	continuousshot	exec
Aspect	setviewparameters	control
-	setdynamicsegssource	exec
-	aspectfromposterconfig	exec
Ndd	init	init
-	setparams	exec
-	setspeed	exec
-	goto	exec
RFLEX	initclient	init
-	setmode	control
-	setwdogref	control
-	pom_tagging	control
-	trackspeedstart	exec
-	stop	exec




Dala properties

Property family	Definition	Modules					Oracle type
		Antenna	Sick	Aspect	Ndd	Rflex	
PEX	initialization must P recede EX ec requests (4 instances)	1	1		1	1	<i>PC</i>
AIB	A ctivity x I nterrupted B y Y (15 instances)	2	4	2	4	3	<i>EE</i>
PRE	aspect.setViewparameter & aspect.setdynamicsource must PRE cede aspect.aspectfromposterconfig			1			<i>PC</i>
	ndd.setparams & ndd.setspeed must PRE cede ndd.goto				1		
EXC	antenna.communicate & rflex.trackspeedstart are mutually EXC lusive	1	○—————○				<i>MX</i>


Test environment




Test environment




Test environment




Versions





GenoM implementation



BIP implementation A




BIP implementation B



Oracle for property $PC[x, C_{PRE}]$

Example: $C_{PRE} =$ activity Q successfully completed



$$C_{PRE}(x(i)) = \exists f_q(k), [t(f_q(k)) < t(x(i))] \wedge [f_q(k) = \text{ok}]$$



		$f_x(i)$		
		$\in \{Z_x, T_x\}$	r_P	$\in R_x \setminus r_P$
$C_{PRE}(x(i))$	true	TN	FP	OP (other positive)
	false	FN	TP	

Oracle for property $PC[x, C_{PRE}]$



$$C_{PRE}(x(i)) = \exists f_q(k), [t(f_q(k)) < t(x(i))] \wedge [f_q(k) = \text{ok}]$$



		$f_x(i)$			
		$\in \{Z_x, T_x\}$	r_P	$\in R_x \setminus r_P$	\emptyset
$C_{PRE}(x(i))$	true	TN	FP	OP (other positive)	w
	false	FN	TP		

Oracle for property $PC[x, C_{PRE}]$

$$C_{PRE}(x(i)) = \exists f_q(k), [t(f_q(k)) < t(x(i))] \wedge [f_q(k) = ok]$$




		$f_x(i)$			
		$\in \{Z_x, T_x\}$	r_P	$\in R_x \setminus r_P$	\emptyset
$C_{PRE}(x(i))$	true	TN	FP	OP (other positive)	w
	false	FN	TP		

Excerpt of trace #137

137 PRE False Neg

1290097074.22	send	18	ASPECT_SETDYNAMICSEGSSOURCE	
1290097074.27	ir	18	ASPECT_SETDYNAMICSEGSSOURCE	
1290097074.31	send	19	ASPECT_ASPECTFROMPOSTERCONFIG	
1290097074.37	rcv	18	ASPECT_SETDYNAMICSEGSSOURCE OK	
1290097099.64	rcv	19	ASPECT_ASPECTFROMPOSTERCONFIG	S_aspect_stdGenoM_ACTIVITY_INTERRUPTED

19 should apparently be rejected since reply 18 not yet received, but it isn't : false observation



Robustness over traces

	Total traces	FN traces	FP traces	Hung traces	Bad traces	Robust traces
GenoM	293	74	5		76	74,06 %
BIP-A	293	40		42	80	72,7 %
BIP-B	293	11		1	12	95,9 %


Robustness over properties

True positive rate (coverage) = $TP / (TP + FN)$

False positive rate = $FP / (FP + TN)$

	Tests	TN	TP	FN	FP	W	TPR	FPR
GenoM	34780	29142	5112	379	32	115	93,1 %	0,1 %
BIP-A	30955	26036	4495	175		249	96,3 %	0,0 %
BIP-B	35066	29226	5694	19		127	99,7 %	0,0 %

Overall Comparison



Conclusion

- 🌐 **Testing was a useful complement to formal development using BIP since people, tools and run-time environments are not correct-by-construction**
- 🌐 **Timing robustness property oracles more difficult to formulate than expected**
- 🌐 **Implementation as SQL queries on XML-coded traces was a good choice**
- 🌐 **Black-box timing robustness testing**
 - 😊 Benchmarking of different implementations
 - 😞 Possibility of false observations