TU Wien

System-level Error-Handling Mechanisms in the Time-Triggered Architecture

H.Kopetz July 2011

Outline

- Introduction
- Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS)
- TTA Overview
- Error Handling Mechanisms
- Conclusion

Component-Based Systems

- The TTA establishes a framework for the design of *dependable component-based cyber-physical systems (CPS)*.
- In order to understand the design decisions taken in and the dependability mechanisms provided by the TTA we have to understand the characteristics of CPS.
- The TTA is based on more than twenty years of research on the topic of dependable real-time systems.

CPS: Physical World meets Cyber World



Physical (P) System versus Cyber (C) System

P-System

Controlled by the laws of physics

Physical time

Time base dense

C-System

Controlled by program execution

Execution time

Time-base sparse

The model of the P-system that is used by the C-system must be aware of the progression of Real time.

Models of Time in a CPS



RT Information has limited temporal validity



An appropriate model of RT communication must consider *timeliness* as important as *correctness*.

Timeliness in Smart Grid Control: << 1 cycle



Many CPS are Resilient



Resilience

In many periodic systems, a single incorrect value will be tolerated by the environment. Examples:

•*Control System:* An analog actuator (e.g., a control valve) will move only by a small value in one control cycle.

•*Multimedia System*: A single incorrect pixel or a single missing frame will be masked by the human perception system.

Control Transactions—*Periodicity*



Cyclic Representation of Time



1 Start of Cycle

D 5 E 6

- A Observation of Sensor Input
- 2 Start of Transmission of Sensor Data

Real-Time

- **B** Transmission of Input Data
- 3 Start of Processing of Control Algorithm
- C Processing of Control Algorithm
- 4 Termination of Processing
- D Transmission of Output Data
- 5 Start of Output to Actuators
- E Output Operation at the Actuator
- 6 Termination of Output Operation

Anytime Algorithms



Architectural Principles of the TTA

- Component Orientation—A component is a hardware/software unit
- All components are time-aware—A global time is provided by the platform.
- Separation of Computation from Communication— Components and Communication systems can be developed independently.
- Core Services are Deterministic—Modular Certification is supported by the architecture.
- Different Integration Levels—IP-Cores form a Chip, Chips form a Device, Devices form systems
- Being Faulty is Normal

Characteristic for the the TTA is the availability of a global physical time of known precision at every component of the architecture. This global time is used to

•Synchronize actions in the physical world and in the cyber world

- •Limit the validity of real-time information
- •Control access to shared resources
- •Strengthen security protocols
- •Detect failures of fail-silent components

Sparse Time Model

Whenever we use the term *time* we mean *physical time* as defined by the international standard of time TAI.

If the occurrence of events is restricted to some active intervals on the timeline with duration π with an interval of silence of duration Δ between any two active intervals, then we call the time base π / Δ -sparse, or **sparse** for short, and events that occur during the active intervals **sparse events**.



Events \mathbf{J} are only allowed to occur at subintervals of the timeline

TTA Architecture Services Overview



Complexity Management in the TTA

The architectural style of the TTA deploys the following *simplification strategies* to reduce the complexity of a design:

- Partitioning: The partitioning of a system into nearly autonomous subsystems (components).--Physical Structure
- Abstraction: The introduction of abstraction layers whereby only the relevant properties of a lower layer are exposed to the upper layer--Structure and Behavior
- **Isolation**: The logical and physical containment of subsystems, such that errors are confined.
- Segmentation: The temporal decomposition of complex behavior into small parts that can be processed sequentially ("step-by-step")--determinism helps!
- Recursion: Use of the same general concepts and mechanisms at different levels of abstraction

What is a *TTA* Component?

- Hardware/software unit that accepts input messages, provides a useful service, maintains internal state, and produces after some *elapsed time* output messages containing the results. It is aware of the progression of physical time
- Unit of abstraction, the behavior of which is captured in a high-level concept that is used to capture the services of a subsystem.
- Fault-Containment-Unit (FCU) that maintains the abstraction in case of fault occurrence and contains the immediate effects of a fault (a fault can propagate from a faulty component to a component that has not been affected by the fault only by erroneous messages).
- Unit of restart, replication and reconfiguration in order to enable the implementation of robustness and fault-tolerance.

Operating System in the TTA

In the TTA, the functions of a monolithic operating system are partitioned into

- A Mini-RTOS in each node, and
- An open-ended set of autonomous OS
 Components that provide operating system services such as
 - Device Controllers (Gateway Components)
 - Integrated Resource Management
 - Security
 - Diagnosis and Robustness
 - Shared Memory Component

The Interfaces of a TTA Component



Software within a Component

Application SW Handles LIF

> GEM handles TII

Mini RTOS handles TDI and Local interf.

Hardware

- Downloading of the component software, the *Job*, into the component hardware via the *TII interface*.
- Communicate with other System
 Components to establish *ports* and *dynamic links*, to reintegrate components after a transient fault etc.
- Global time management
- Provision of API Services (e.g., send and receive of a message)
- Scheduling of the tasks within a component
- Service of the *TII Interface* to *reset, start,* and *terminate* the operation of a component
- Provision of Generic Middleware Services (GEM)

Linking Interface Specification

The Linking interface is a *message-based* interface. Its specification consists of three parts:

- Transport Specification: contains the information needed to transport a message from the sender to the receiver. Temporal properties are part of the transport specification.
- Operational Specification: specifies the syntactic structure of the bit stream contained in the message and establishes the message variable names that point to the concepts at the meta level.
- Meta-Level Specification: assigns meaning to the message variable names established by the operational specification.

Operational Specification

Operational Specification:

- Operational Input Interface Specification
 - Syntactic Specification (e.g. by IDL)
 - Input Assertion
- Operational Output Interface Specification
 - Syntactic Specification (e.g. by IDL)
 - Output Assertion
- Interface State: contents of data structure at ground state .

Specification of the assertions is important.

Meta-Level Specification: Interface Model

- specifies the relationship between the *real world* and the meaning of the *message variables*.
- must be expressed with concepts that are familiar to the conceptual world of the intended users.
- must include the context of use, i.e. a (constrained) model of the environment.
- The brittleness of natural language cannot be avoided in open components.
- Meta-level specification remain often informal --Formalization increases the precision, but at the same time increases the distance to reality (Chargaff)
- Beware of *pseudo-formalism*.



Example of a Cluster--*Recursion*



Gateway Components

Gateway components can connect two clusters that may be based on different *architectural styles*:



 The representation of the information in the two clusters will be different, but the *semantic content* of the *message variables* must be the same.

Communication in the TTA



CompetitionversusCooperationBest-EffortTime TriggeredProbabilisticDeterministic

Unidirectional Deterministic Multi-cast Message

- Uni-directionality is required to
 - decouple communication from computation
 - decouple the sender behavior from the receiver behavior
- Determinism is required to
 - establish timeliness
 - simplify the reasoning about the behavior (*modus pones*)
 - simplify testing (repeatable test cases)
 - be able to implement active replication (TMR)
 - support the certification
- *Multi-cast* is required to support
 - the independent observation of the component behavior
 - the *support of diagnosis*
 - replication of state at multiple components
 - Triple Modular Redundancy

Message Types

Periodic Messages (TT) (core)

- No queues, non-consuming read, update in place
- Temporal guarantees

Sporadic Messages (ET) (core)

- characterized by two queues, one at the sender site and one at the receiver site
- Exactly once semantics
- Normally best effort timing
- Real-time Data Streams
 - Guaranteed bandwidth and timing (core)
 - Queues with watermark management (optional)

Openness: Any communication protocol (wire-bound or wireless) that provides these services can be used

Core: Time-Triggered Communication

- In a time-triggered communication system, the sender and receiver(s) agree a priori on a cyclic time-controlled conflict-free communication schedule for the sending of time-triggered messages.
- In every period, a message is sent at exactly the same phase.
- The control and data flow is unidirectional.
- Error detection is in the sphere of control of the receiver, based on his *a priori* knowledge of the arrival instants of messages.

Temporal Error Containment by the CS

It is *impossible* to maintain the communication among the correct components of a RT-cluster if the temporal errors caused by a faulty component are not contained.

Error containment of an arbitrary temporal node failure requires that the shared Comm. System is a self-contained FCU that has temporal information about the allowed behavior of the nodes—

It must contain applicationspecific state.



Levels of Fault Mitigation in the TTA

- I. Normal Operation
- II. Swift Component Recovery after a transient fault
- III. On-Chip TMR: to handle transient and permanent faults within a chip
- IV. Off-Chip TMR: to handle a transient and permanent fault of a total chip.
- V. NGU (Never-Give-Up) Strategy: to handle multiple correlated transient faults.

The Swiss-Cheese Model



We distinguish between:

- •**Transient faults** (hardware, Heisenbugs, operation): Recovery by a ground state monitor
- •Permanent faults: masking by replicated selfchecking components or by TMR.

In the TTA we focus on the fast recovery after a transient fault. Diagnosis of the fault is postponed and allocated to a diagnostic system.

State of a CPS

The state enables the determination of a future output solely on the basis of the future input and the state the system is in. In other word, the state enables a "decoupling" of the past from the present and future. The state embodies all past history of a system. Knowing the state "supplants" knowledge of the past. . . . Apparently, for this role to be meaningful, the **notion of past and future** must be relevant for the system considered.

Mesarovic, p.45

Ground State

The ground state of a component is a the state of a component at an instant when all tasks are inactive and where all communication channels are empty.

A relevant ground state must be provided to reintegrate a component after a hardware reset.



The ground state monitor is an independent FCU that receives periodically a ground-state message, checks the message and, if erroneous, resets the component and provides an estimated ground state for the next recovery instant.



Restart after a Failure

- The Monitored Component sends periodically the G-State to the GS-Monitor.
- The GS-Monitor performs state-estimation to the next restart instant.
- In case a GS-state message is missing (fail silence) or wrong (non-fail silence) the GS monitor sends a reset/restart message to the failed component.
- After the receipt of a reset message at the TII Interface, the component performs a hardware reset and restarts its operation with the ground-state that is contained in the restart message.

TII-Addr	Time	Ground State at Reintegration Instant
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Ground State Recovery





A failure of the faulty component is

- 1. Fail silent: no output message is produced
- 2.Non-fail silent: the incorrect output message does not pass the output assertion of the sender
- *3.Non-fail silent:* the incorrect output message does not pass the input assertion of the receiver
- **4.Non-fail silent:** the incorrect output message passes all assertions.

What is the probability of for each one of these cases?







The GENESYS Chip consists of the *Trusted Subsystem* and IP Cores:

- The Trusted Subsystem is formed by the Trusted Resource Monitor (TRM) and Trusted Interface Subsystems (TISS) to the components and the TTNoC.
- The IP-cores are connected to the TISSes. The TISS will contain an arbitrary temporal failure (harware or software) of a non-trusted IP core

Chip Level: GENESYS Prototype



What is Needed to Implement TMR?

What architectural services are needed to implement Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) at the architecture level?

- Provision of an Independent Fault-Containment Region for each one of the replicated components
- Synchronization Infrastructure for the components
- Predictable Multicast Communication
- Replicated Communication Channels
- Support for Voting
- Deterministic (*which includes timely*) Operation
- Identical state in the distributed components

Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR)

Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) is the *generally accepted technique* for the mitigation of component failures at the system level:



On-Chip TMR



Off-Chip TMR



Example: TMR Configuration



Example: TMR Configuration



Outlook: System of Systems

In many fields there are *multiple provider systems* for a requested service. A SoS can *dynamically select* the most appropriate provider.

Example: Transportation

- Airline
- Train
- Car



Conclusion

- The increasing dependence of society on the functioning of the ICT systems requires new approaches to dependability.
- System-level dependability techniques can cover transient hardware failures and Heisenbugs in the Software.
- The conceptual simplicity of the TTA supports the implementation of fast recovery actions in cyber-physical systems.

More Information

The GENESYS Architecture is described in a book that can be downloaded freely from the Internet:

http://www.genesys-platform.eu/genesys_book.pdf



Background information can be found in the second revised edition of my book

Real-Time Systems—Design Principles for Distributed Embedded Applications

published by *Springer Verlag* on April 27 , 2011.