An Architecture for Robust and Fault Tolerant Autonomous Robots

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Toulouse, France

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Autonomous Systems

Lama

Dala

Autonomous Systems



Exploration Rovers



Drones

Lama



Satellites



Space Probes

Dala

Interacting with humans

Autonomous Systems

Autonomous Systems

Companion Robots

Autonomous Systems

Companion Robots

Service Robots

Interacting with humans

Autonomous Systems



Companion Robots

Service Robots



Tour Robots

The problem

To improve the dependability of Autonomous robots and systems

- Large number of functional subsystems
  - Sensors/Effectors
- Decisional capabilities
  - planning/scheduling, supervision and plan execution control
- Evolve in the real world...

Dependability



[ALR 04] A. Avizienis, J.C. Laprie & B. Randell, Dependability and its Threats : A Taxonomy. 18th IFIP World Congress, 2004

Dependability



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Dependability



continuity of correct service

absence of catastrophic consequences on the user(s) and the environment

means to avoid service failures in the presence of faults

[ALR 04] A. Avizienis, J.C. Laprie & B. Randell, Dependability and its Threats : A Taxonomy. 18th IFIP World Congress, 2004

Objectives

- To offer some guarantees on the dependability of autonomous systems (reliability and safety)
- Choice of architecture : Hierarchical Architecture
- Mean : Online execution control (fault tolerance)

Why an architecture?

- Robots are complex systems
  - numerous sensors and effectors
- Various type of processing
  - functional / decisional
  - real time / exponential complexity
- Sharing information and codes
  - interoperability

Properties

- Programmability
  - multiple environments or tasks,
  - different abstract levels
- Adaptability
- Reactivity
- Consistent behavior
- Extensibility / Reusability
- Robustness / Dependability

Architectures

Remote Agent (Nasa)



[Bernard 00] D. Bernard et al., Remote Agent Experiment.
Rapport technique Nasa ARC & JPL, 2000

Architectures



IDEA (Nasa)



[Muscettola 02] N. Muscettola et al., IDEA : Planning at the Core of Autonomous Reactive Agents. 3rd Int. NASA Workshop on Planning & Scheduling for Space, 2002

Architectures





CLARAty (Nasa)



[NWBSE 03] I.A. Nesnas et al., CLARAty and Challenges of Developing Interoperable Robotic Software. IROS 2003

Architectures







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

The LAAS Architecture

The LAAS Architecture



Functional Level

- GenoM independant modules corresponding to a group of functionalities.
- Each module provides a service
- Real Time aspect
- Algorithm are broken down in pieces
- Each task has its own priority/ frequency



Functional Level





GenoM


Decisional Level
Procedural Executive (open-PRS)
Planner (IxTeT-eXeC)
Execution Control Level
Execution Controller
Functional Level
Antenne
Lane
Env
P3D
Speed
POM
Pos
NDD
Speed
Scorrel
Im. St.
Science
VME
Pos
Aspect
Obs
RFLEX
Pos
Camera
Im.
Platine
Laser RF
Scan
ATRV
iRobot

GenoM


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

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

- Each module is an instance of this one



Requests:
Take Image
Save Image to Disk

Poster:
Images

GenoM



- Each module is an instance of this one
- Each activity runs an automaton such as this one





GenoM

- Provides a "software engineering" framework
- Many implementation aspects are relieved from the programmer (communication, threading, etc)
- Internal automaton for the internal activities

Decisional Level (Task Planning)

IxTeT

- Action representation
- Given a goal and a state produce a plan to reach it
- Repair and replan




```
task TAKE_PICTURE(?obj,?x,?y)(t_start,t_end){
  ?obj in OBJECTS;
  ?x in ]-oo,+oo[; ?y in ]-oo,+oo[;

  hold(AT_ROBOT_X():?x,(t_start,t_end));
  hold(AT_ROBOT_Y():?y,(t_start,t_end));
  hold(PTU_POSITION():downward,(t_start,t_end));

  event(PICTURE(?obj,?x,?y):(none,doing),t_start);
  hold(PICTURE(?obj,?x,?y):doing,(t_start,t_end));
  event(PICTURE(?obj,?x,?y):(doing,done),t_end);

  use(CAMERA():1,(t_start,t_end));
  variable ?image_size;
  variable ?cr;
  compression_rate(?cr);
  ?image_size = 175610 * ?cr;
  consume(STORAGE():?image_size,t_start);

  (t_end - t_start) in ]0,60];
}nonPreemptive
```

TAKE_PICTURE(?obj,?x,?y)

Decisional Level (Task Planning)

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



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



Decisional Level (Procedural Executive)

OpenPRS

- Refine high level "task"
- Some local recoveries
- Goal and Data driven procedures
- Use procedural reasoning





Decisional Level

- Brings some operational "robustness"
  - Plan repair
  - Failure recovery from the Procedural Executive

Dependability of Autonomous Systems

- Functional level hard to validate :
  - we may validate 1 module (synchronous language, UPPAAL, Spin ...)
  - but hard to validate tens and their concurrent interactions...
- Decisional based on AI concept (complex formalism, ...)
- Environment can hardly be modeled (unforeseen evolutions, ...)

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Such a system offers little guarantee w.r.t reliability and safety

Proposed Solution

The component must have the following properties

Observable	knowledge at all time of the events which may change the state of the system.
Control	ability to act upon these events to maintain the system in a safe and consistent state.
Real Time	decide and act in real-time.
Validation	use formal method.
Simple	ease of use to program the constraints and the rules.
Integrated	well integrated in the rest of the architecture.



The Request and Report Checker



The Request and Report Checker

1 Events Capture



The Request and Report Checker

1. Events Capture
2. State Update



The Request and Report Checker

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2. State Update
3. State Checker



The Request and Report Checker

1. Events Capture
2. State Update
3. State Checker
4. Actions Exec.



Principle

- Formal model of the system (automates, RdP, ...)
- Desired properties



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

Model-checking :

- OK
- NO + counter example(s)

Principle

- Formal model of the system (automates, RdP, ...)
- Desired properties



Controller synthesis
- detect dangerous transitions w.r.t P
- generate a component which blocks them

Expression of the properties : CTL

CTL : Computational Tree Logic

- time is seen as the tree of possible future





- Operators :
  - X p (next p), G p (always p), F p (p will be true), p U q (p until q), p W q (p weak until q)
  - with quantifiers A (all) or E (eventually)
- Exemple : AG(R ➡ A(R W G))
- Formalism well known and mastered by the model checking community

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



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



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



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- Exemple : AG(R → A(R W G))

If the light is red
it will remain red or go green

- Formalism well known and mastered by the model checking community

OBDDs

- OBDD : Ordered Binary Decision Diagram
- Binary graph where nodes correspond to a binary test
- Canonical and compact form
- Drawbacks :
  - sensitive to variables order
  - only symbolic variables



[Bryant 86] R.E. Bryant, Graph-Based Algorithms for Boolean Function Manipulation. Transactions on Computers, 1986.
[Burch 92] J.R. Burch et al., Symbolic Model Checking : 10^{20} States and Beyond. Information & Computing, 1992.

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

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OCRDs

- Similar to OBDDs
- variables have a fixed constraint associated :
  e.g. y in [0.0, +∞[
- for each variable we create a partition w.r.t. the constraints
- result is equivalent to an OBDD



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

We can express fixed constraints on request arguments and report values.

Example

```
check {
never: running(camera.takeshot()) && !last(camera.init(?mode));
always: last(camera.init(?mode) with ?mode!=LOW)
            => !( running(platine.move(?pos))
                  && running(camera.takeshot()) );
}
```

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

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

State Checker



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

1- We set the non controllable predicates

State Checker



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

2- We evaluate the cost of various solution

State Checker



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

3- We choose the less expensive solution (p1<p2)

Test With An Autonomous Robot

- Plan (IxTeT-Exec) :
  - Objective : take science pictures in a time frame
  - Repair or replan when problems occur
  - Adding goal during communication window



Constraints on Dala

```
#define refME "rflex"

check {
 always: ( running(pom.addME) || running(pom.addSE) )  => last(pom.SetModel);
 never: running(pom.SetRefME with arg.name!=refME);
 always: running(pom.setRefME) => last(pom.addME with arg.name==refME);
 always: running(pom.Run) => last(pom.setRefME);
 always: running(ndd.GoTo) => last(pom.Run);
 always: running(ndd.GoTo) => ( last(ndd.SetParams) && last(ndd.SetSpeed with arg.linear<1.0 ) );
 always: running(ndd.GoTo) => running(aspect.AspectFromPosterConfig);
 always: running(aspect.AspectFromPosterConfig) => last(aspect.SetViewParameters);
 always: running(aspect.AspectFromPosterConfig with
                    arg.posPosterName.name.name=="pomSickFramePos") => last(sick.SetPomTagging with arg==SICK_TRUE);
always: running(aspect.AspectFromPosterConfig with
                     arg.posPosterName.name.name=="pomSickFramePos") => last(sick.ContinuousShot);
 never: running(antenna.Comunicate) && running(rflex.TrackSpeedStart);
 never: running(rflex.TrackSpeedStart) && ( running(platine.CmdPosCoord) || running(platine.CmdPosPan)
                                          || running(platine.CmdPosTilt) || running(platine.TrackPos) );
 never: running(rflex.TrackSpeedStart with arg.name.value.v>0.9);
 always: running(antenna.Comunicate) => last(antenna.AddWindow);
 always: running(antenna.AddWindow) => last(antenna.Init);
 always: running(camera.OneShot) => last(camera.Initialize);
 never: running(camera.OneShot) &&( running(platine.CmdPosCoord) || running(platine.CmdPosPan)
                                  || running(platine.CmdPosTilt) || running(platine.TrackPos) );
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```

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```

17 rules
1 to 5 predicates per rules

Resulting OCRD for Dala



Depth : 28

# of nodes : 33

Processing time of the R^2C < 0.4ms

Demonstration ...

Demonstration ...



R²C on Dala: Usage Analysis

- Detected "real" problems in the Procedural Executive procedures
- Online control => enforces some dependability at all time
- No noticeable effect on the performance of the system

Conclusion


Decisional Level
Procedural Executive (open-PRS)
Planner (IxTeT-eXeC)
Execution Control Level
Execution Controller
Functional Level
ENVIRONMENT

Conclusion

- Functional
  - semi formal framework
  - reusability
  - ease of integration
- Tool: GenoM



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

- Execution Control
  - Fault tolerance (safety bag)
  - Tools: R2C

Conclusion

- Functional
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

- Decisional
  - bring the autonomy
  - procedural executive
  - planning possible...
  - ... plan execution
  - control is then desirable
  - Tools: OpenPRS, IxTeT

Conclusion

- Functional
  - semi formal framework
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  - Tool: GenoM
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

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  - bring the autonomy
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  - planning possible...
  - ... plan execution control is then desirable
  - Tools: OpenPRS, IxTeT

http://softs.laas.fr/

Related Ongoing Works (LAAS)

- SAC (Critical Autonomous System) project (presented by David Powell)
- Safety Bag "rules" specifications (PhD LAAS)
- AMAES (Advanced Methods for Autonomous Embedded Systems, LAAS, Verimag), timed automata (functional and decisional level)
- AGATA (architecture for autonomous satellite)
- COGNIRON (Cognitive Robot EEC FP6 Project)

Thanks


...and so, in conclusion, the proposed method...
THANK GOODNESS, ALMOST OVER... HOPEFULLY I DIDN'T BORE THEM TO TEARS.
...thank you, you've been a great audience...
OK, THE OBLIGATORY CALL FOR QUESTIONS AND I AM DONE...
any ques...
JORGE CHAM © 2004
...tions?
OR NOT.
www.phdcomics.com