

- 1. Certifiable Wireless Data Buses**
- 2. Autonomous Navigation**

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# Certifiable Wireless Data Buses

- **Objective: Replace wired avionics data buses with wireless data buses**
  - Can we replace a wired bus such as ARINC 629 with a wireless equivalent?
  
- **Rationale:**
  - **Reduced weight**
    - ◆ Translates to lower fuel costs
  - **Ease of re-configurability of aircraft**
  - **Lower installation and maintenance costs**

# Wireless Data Buses on Aircraft: State of the Practice

- **Wireless data buses are being used for**
  - **Cabin entertainment systems**
    - ◆ Reduces cost associated with changing seat pitch, seasonal changes in configuration (number of 1<sup>st</sup> class seats)
  - **Lavatory smoke detectors**
    - ◆ Today airplanes have superfluous wiring to accommodate different configurations used by different airlines
  - **Cargo hold smoke detectors**
  - **Emergency lighting system**

*All wireless data buses used today are for non-critical applications*

# Wireless Data Buses for Critical Applications

- **The wireless data bus must be:**
  - **Reliable**
  - **Available**
  - **Protects data integrity**
  - **Deterministic**
    - ◆ Bounded delivery times, low jitter
  - **Secure**
    - ◆ Low susceptibility to denial-of-service attacks (jamming)
    - ◆ Authenticated messages
    - ◆ Encryption?
  - **Non-interference**
    - ◆ Must not interfere with existing radios and avionics
  - **Certifiable**
    - ◆ If a data bus does not have the above properties it will be extremely difficult to certify any application that uses it

# Challenges

- **Certification is the biggest challenge**
- **Requirements are not well understood**
  - **E.g.: “How much” jamming resilience is required?**
    - ◆ How is this specified?
    - ◆ How “jamming resistant” are today’s avionics when personal radios are not allowed on board
- **Lack of a good understanding of the faults suffered by wireless networks**
- **Current certification processes are inadequate**
  - **Limited to understanding the effects of on-board wireless systems on existing radios and avionics**
- **Where in the RF spectrum should these networks operate?**
  - **The only globally available frequency band is the 2.4 GHz ISM band**
- **Requires a change in the mind-set of the certification authorities**
  - **Knee-jerk reaction is to reject anything wireless as being inherently un-certifiable**

# Designing a Wireless Data Bus

- **Given any dependability and security requirements it is possible to design a wireless data bus that meets those requirements**
- **Will such a bus deliver adequate bandwidth?**
  - **Techniques used to improve dependability and security typically result in reduced bandwidth**

# Commonly Used Techniques for Dependability and Security

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- **A combination of techniques will be needed to meet dependability, determinism and security requirements**
- **Different techniques provide tolerance for different kinds of faults and are implemented at different layers of the protocol stack**

# Techniques for Jamming Resistance

- **Spread spectrum techniques**
  - Spread energy over larger part of the spectrum
  - Frequency hopping and Direct Sequence Pseudo Noise are commonly used
    - ◆ Time Hop and Transform Domain spread spectrum techniques less common
- **Typically use combination of techniques**
  - Frequency hopping + direct sequence
    - ◆ Permits use of wide-spaced bands (hop among bands and spread energy within band)
- **For additional protection, send same bit(s) over multiple frequency hops**
  - Keeps a narrow-band jammer from taking out a part of the communication
- **For Frequency Hopping, hopping sequence must not be guessable**
  - Cryptographic techniques
    - ◆ Can't guess seed of random number generator by observing generated numbers
  - Re-seed all random number generators during scheduled maintenance



# Techniques for Reliability, Determinism and Security

- **Physical/Link layer**
  - Bits transmitted over multiple frequency hops
  - Determinism
- **Network layer: At least N independent pre-computed routes between any two nodes**
  - Tolerates failures on nodes
- **Application layer: Control applications that can tolerate delayed or lost messages**
- **Security**
  - Needed for authentication and possibly encryption
  - Aircraft wide-key, changed during scheduled maintenance

# Ongoing Efforts

- A consortium of aerospace companies including Honeywell is working with the FAA on certification issues
- The RTCA SC-202 committee is studying the effects of on-board radios on avionics and other air to ground radio systems
  - Radios at different frequencies and radios that turn on and off
- NASA and the European Space Agency have been characterizing the RF environment on-board aircraft
- Research on control over unreliable communication links

*It's only a matter of time before we see wireless network based critical systems.*

# Autonomous Navigation

**Honeywell**

# Autonomous Navigation

- **Honeywell, as a leader in navigation technologies is pursuing business in the area of autonomous navigation**
- **Potential markets include**
  - Military
  - Mining
  - Mowing
  - ...
- **We are currently working with a major manufacturer of mowers and a university to develop an autonomous mower**
  - Golf courses: fairway mowing

# Autonomous Mowing of Fairways

- **Less challenging than many of the autonomous systems we heard about this week**
  - **Relatively benign terrain**
  - **Well known terrain**
    - ◆ Good topological maps
  - **Possible to install navigation infrastructure**
    - ◆ GPS/RTK
  - **Possible to install communication infrastructure**
    - ◆ Mower to operator station



# Challenges

- **Safety!**
  - Golfers, fauna
- **Precision Navigation**
  - Parallel cuts, signature cuts
  - Claim: 5cm position accuracy
- **Sensing**
  - **Obstacles**
    - ◆ Small objects, uncontrolled lighting
  - Fairway edges
- **Poor mower dynamics**
  - Stopping distance ~5m at 2-3 m/s
- **Reliable communications with a mobile base station**
- **User interfaces**
  - Barely literate groundskeepers
  - Supervisor in maintenance building is typically computer literate
- **Marketability**
  - Cost: one time and recurring
  - US export controls prevent use of certain inertial navigation technologies

