# Security Attacks and Defenses

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# Agenda

Kinds of attacks \*\* Infrastructure threats Monetizing attacks Social engineering threats (phishing) Defensive techniques Automatic patching **Development tools Run-time techniques** Leveraging automated feedback from customers

# **Kinds of Attacks**

Infrastructure attacks • **OS/local machine** Web server **Network protocols** Some techniques becoming more prevalent SQL injections, cross-site scripting **Rooted in poor development practices Building hitlists from Google & other public** sources **Better saturation of vulnerable hosts** We're not hearing about attacks on custom \*\* applications (if it's happening it's quiet)

# **Attack Goals Shifting**

We've seen a dramatic shift in the past 12-18 months in the goal of these attacks Used to be malicious behavior Now it's financial Exploits are used to install Bots Or the info is sold for \$\$\$ Networks of controlled exploited \* machines (BotNets) are then sold **Spammers Organized crime** 

# Terminology

- ✤ Bot
  - Application that performs action on behalf of a remote controller
  - Installed on a victim machine (zombie)
  - Most are open-source
  - Modular (plug in your functionality / exploit / payload)
- BotNet
  - Linkage of "owned" machines into centrally controlled armies
  - Literally, *roBOT NETworks*
- Control Channel
  - Method for communicating with an army
- Herder
  - a.k.a. Bot herder, controller, pimp
  - Owns control channel, commands BotNet army
  - Motivations money, power

### **Bots & BotNets**

#### Bots are prolific

- Earthlink claims 20% of machines have bots and/or spyware
- May account for 1/3 of all email traffic from comcast.net
- Spam
  - Bots sent 66% of all SPAM traffic on the Internet
  - Bots are rented to spammers
  - Provide mass mailing and anonymity
- Identity theft
  - Some versions include scanners for SSNs and credit card information
- DDoS / Extortion
  - Used for sustained DDoS attacks
  - Used for online extortion against Internet merchants
- Infringement/License violations
  - Scanners for CD keys and content

# **Monetizing BotNets**

- First large-scale monetization done with MyDoom.A
  - Eight days after MyDoom.A hit the Internet, somebody scanned millions of IP addresses looking for the back door left by the worm
  - The attackers searched for systems with a Trojan horse called Mitglieder installed
  - Then used those systems as their spam engines
  - Millions of computers across the Internet were now for sale to the underground spam community

#### **BotNet Spammer Rental Rates**

>20-30k always online SOCKs4, url is de-duped and updated every
>10 minutes. 900/weekly, Samples will be sent on request.
>Monthly payments arranged at discount prices.

#### 3.6 cents per Bot week

>\$350.00/weekly - \$1,000/monthly (USD)
>Type of service: Exclusive (One slot only)
>Always Online: 5,000 - 6,000
>Updated every: 10 minutes

#### 6 cents per Bot week

>\$220.00/weekly - \$800.00/monthly (USD)
>Type of service: Shared (4 slots)
>Always Online: 9,000 - 10,000
>Updated every: 5 minutes

#### 2.5 cents per Bot week

September 2004 postings to SpecialHam.com, Spamforum.biz29-JAN-200547th Meeting of IFIP WG 10.4

#### **Current situation**

- BotNets themselves unseen; uses are noticed
  - Spam relays
  - Identity theft, credit cards, keystrokes, other PII
  - DDoS attacks
- Ease of writing, deploying Bots is increasing
  - GUIs driven by script kiddies (13 year olds)
  - Many don't know how to program "personalized" bots
  - Automatic scanning for vulnerable machines
- Threat is escalating
  - Low profile (vs. Slammer / MyDoom / phishing, etc.)
  - Financial opportunity driving activity
  - Model is maturing into tiers herders, service providers
  - Numbers are increasing
  - Bot technologies are getting better

# **Bot Pedigree**

Relatively few "families" of Bots **Based on open source Bot collaboration** efforts Berbew, Gaobot, … Custom variants abound Typically see 3 to 5 new variants per week Have seen as many as 50 per day

#### **BotNet use: Data Theft**

Bots often have built-in functionality to steal
Documents or data from an infected computer
Computer passwords, IRC passwords
Bank account numbers and passwords
PayPal account info
Credit card data
Keystroke loggers

http://www.lurhq.com/phatbot.html

#### **Botnet use: Extortion**

Small-scale: Even small BotNets (a few hundred machines) can extort online businesses for money.

Small site in Kentucky taken down for a week because they refused to pay \$10k

http://www.courier-journal.com/business/news2004/05/10/F1-scam10-8568.html

Large-scale: Crime rings extorting business for "protection monies".

A number of UK gambling sites have been offered protection for \$50k/year

http://www.rense.com/general44/hack.htm

### **Attack Trends**

From isolated to networked Attacker is on the "outside" From programs to services • **Unconstrained input** From multi-user to single user to multi-user "User as admin" problem From asynchronous to mass malware \*\* **Asymmetry favors attacker** From vandalism to for profit \*\* More dedicated attackers From specific to general to specific � Value will draw more sophisticated adversaries

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# **Phishing Attacks**

#### Much more than a nuisance

- Hotmail is blocking ~3B pieces of spam per day, much of it phishing attacks
- Most people (>60% of the American public) have inadvertently visited a fake or spoofed site.
- Over 15% of respondents admit to having provided personal data to a spoofed site.
- Trending upward: more fake e-mails, spoofed Web sites and phishing scams.
- Most vulnerable targets: banks, credit card companies, Web retailers, online auctions (E-bay) and mortgage companies.

### **Losses from Phishing**

Estimated economic losses:

Small number of people (slightly more than 2%) affected, with an average cost of \$115 dollars/victim.

Extrapolating to the entire U.S. population, economic impact of fraud close to \$500M.

# **Defensive Techniques**


- Automated patching
- Development tools
- Run-time techniques
- Leveraging automated feedback from customers

# First, Some Numbers


- 656.5M PCs run Windows Client worldwide
  - OEMs shipped 115.4M Windows PCs in 2004
- MS Malicious Software Removal Tool
  - Released 1/11/05 targets 8 families of malware
  - As of 1/27/2005
    - Run over 104M times
    - Over 177K infected hosts cleaned
- MS Anti-Spyware Beta
  - Over 3M downloads in <2 weeks

# **Automatic Patching**

- Windows Update services 190M PCs
- 140M PCs use Automatic Updates to stay current with patches
- Time to update 95% of XP PCs with a patch via Automatic Update
  - <14 days</p>



# **Vulnerability Timeline**



#### Days From Patch To Exploit

- Have decreased so that patching is not a defense in large organizations
- Average 9 days for patch to be reverse engineered to identify vulnerability

Days between patch & exploit 331



### **Development Tools**

Source code defect detection tools
 PREfix & PREfast (C/C++)

Detects defects like bounds violations, resource exhaustion, memory management errors, format string errors, etc.

#### FXCop (MSIL -- .NET managed code)

- Detects defects in these categories: Library design, Localization, Naming conventions, Performance, Security
- Developers run versions of these tools before checking code into a product tree.

We also integrate the tools directly into the build process for automatic scans & bug reporting

### **Run-time Techniques**

**Dynamic input scanning** • Ex: URL filtering Middleware-based isolation JVM, CLR, other host-based VMs OS virtualization VMWare/Virtual PC/Xen Hypervisors (IBM sHype, Intel VT) 

#### Leveraging Customer Feedback

#### MS Online Crash Analysis

- Mechanism for reporting errors back to Microsoft, along with some debugging & tracing information ("minidumps")
- OCA reports are bucketed by application/module offset information
- Minidump analysis identifies likely buffer overruns & other issues
- Potential code defects automatically flagged for developer review

# Summary

- ♦ Attack frequency ↑
- ♦ Vandalism → monetary objectives
- Patch reverse engineering time ↓

### **Blatant Workshop Plug**

DIMACS Workshop on Security of Web Services & E-Commerce
 May 5-6, 2005
 DIMACS Center, Rutgers Univ. Piscataway, NJ
 CFP deadline: February 11, 2005

http://dimacs.rutgers.edu/Workshops/Commerce/

