

Byzantine Filtering


- From WG10.4 in Siena
(and our 2003 SAFECOMP and 2004 IEEE DASC papers)
 - Byzantine fault propagation “physics” and example
 - Combating Byzantine Generals’ fault propagation
 - ◆ Masking (blocks Byzantine signals via dominant logic)
 - Two-of-Three voter example
 - Can be done only with *completely* independent sources (*completely* independent sources are very rare)
 - ◆ Filtering (converts a Byzantine signal to non-Byzantine)
 - Buried within all real Byzantine tolerance mechanisms
 - Needs to be tested to determine coverage
 - Byzantine filter testing idea
 - But, can this be done with a practicable number of tests?
 - ◆ How can proof-of-coverage testing be reduced?
 - An answer that reduces amplitude test range
- Braided Ring: A network to exploit Byzantine filtering




Digital Circuitry Behavior

There is no such thing as digital circuitry, ...
there is just analog circuitry driven to extremes.


This allows the possibility of a digital logic signal being “1/2”.



Logic Gate Transfer Function with "1/2" Noise



$\frac{1}{2}$ input is in the gate's highest gain region, any noise is greatly amplified




Byzantine Filtering

- **Bit-level (waveform) filtering**
 - **Implemented with any combination of:**
 - ◆ **Schmitt triggers**
 - ◆ **Synchronizers**
(same as used to mitigate metastability)
 - ◆ **Glitch filters**
 - ◆ **... (almost any technique to reduce noise)**
 - **Perfect coverage impossible**
 - **Need to determine coverage of implementation**
 - ◆ **Typical pessimistic system Byzantine failure probability is 10^{-5} (10 nodes, 10 critical components in each node with 10^{-7} probability of failure)**
 - ◆ **Typical system requires $< 10^{-10}$ probability of failure**
 - ◆ **Typical coverage needs to be 0.99999**

“Byzantine” Fault Injection

Concept:

Create a suitably representative set of faulty waveforms




Acronyms:

PRNG = Pseudo Random Number Generator


D / A = Digital to Analog Converter

PUT = Port Under Test


Bit Cell Decision Threshold




Remove Test Sample Points Past Hold Time



Test Amplitude Reduction with Known Threshold




"1/2" DUT Output Signal Rejection




How to Find a Device's Input Threshold

- Connect a device's output back to its input such that the loop has an odd number of inversions in it.
 - This creates an oscillator.
- Add an integrator with a very large time constant.
 - This filters out the oscillations.
- Integrator's output settles on a value which is the input's threshold voltage.




Completion of the Tester

- Add the pseudo-exhaustive bit pattern trajectories to the input feedback (with a reduced number of amplitude test points).
- Either latch the integrator's output before applying the test patterns or make sure the test patterns are "DC balanced" over the time constant of the integrator.




The Path of Low-Cost Dependable Systems

- **Redundant Bus**
 - Not sufficient due to spatial proximity faults (unavoidable via routing)
 - Serious issues with babbling and masquerade failures
 - ◆ Local Guardians not truly independent




- **Redundant Star**
 - Independent guardians (G)
 - Reshaping in Guardians performs Byzantine filtering
 - Dual architecture does not allow arbitrarily faulty components
 - What dependability level can be reached?
 - ◆ Weakest link principle says 10^{-6}
 - 10^{-6} is not good enough
 - ◆ Try argue bizarre fault mode has lower probability
 - ◆ Or use triplex (not low cost)




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



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
Braided Ring

- Begins with traditional braided ring
 - Each node has **links to two nearest neighbors** and **links to two next nearest neighbors**
 - Each link is 2x unidirectional
 - Four link paths from each source to each destination (used for availability only)
- Adds these new ideas
 - Eliminate half of transmitters and ~1/4 of wire length
 - Uses Byzantine filtering during bit regeneration in each node
 - Does a bit-for-bit compare of each node's output vs input
 - ◆ Mismatches set a failed flag in the tail of bad messages
 - ◆ Nearly 100% coverage of regeneration errors
 - ...




Availability versus Integrity

- The Availability “OR”
 - If miscompare, arbitrarily select one
 - Goal is readiness for correct service




- The Integrity “AND”
 - If miscompare, reject both
 - Goal is absence of improper alterations



Simple 2x replication gives you availability or integrity but not both!


Checking for Node Failures

- Errors of components are detected by doing a bit-for-bit compare of node's input versus output




Checking for Node Failures

- Errors of components are detected by doing a bit-for-bit compare of node's input versus output
- Comparison of protocol behavior (timing)




Braided Ring is a Full Coverage Architecture

- Full coverage data propagation
 - “true” 10^{-9}
- Neighboring nodes perform guardian function
- No need for separate silicon for guardian
 - Saves silicon and thus cost




One of Many Ways to Cable the Braided Ring

- **“Skip” links to next nearest neighbors can be routed via nearest neighboring nodes**
- **Useful when bundling cable costs are a significant part of wiring costs**




Detection Containment Bypasses

- Need to detect internal and external bypasses of devices entrusted to do fault (error) containment.




Detection Containment Bypasses

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- Solution: “Encrypt” each link differently

Ring Example Using the Minimum 6 Keys



legend: different color represents
different encoding

Benefits of a Braided Ring

- **Compared to a bus topology system**
 - Survives a proximately fault
 - Babble and masquerade faults stopped by neighbors
 - ◆ No problem with untrustable local guardians
 - ◆ No need to add another integrated circuit for guardianship
 - ◆ No electrical fault isolation needed for network interface
- **Compared to a star topology system**
 - No need for additional (triplex) central components
 - ◆ Less cost
 - ◆ Less unreliability
 - Less costly wiring
 - ◆ Cable has to go only to nearest neighbor, not all the way to a central star
- **Optimally cheap Byzantine solution?**