




Dependability Concepts for Malicious Faults

David Powell & Yves Deswarte




Dependability & Survivability Workshop
IFIP WG 10.4 meeting, Hilton Head Island, SC, USA
27 June - 1 July 2002



Summary

- ❖ Causal chain of threats
- ❖ Security policy and security failure
- ❖ Intrusion, attack and vulnerability
- ❖ Security methods
- ❖ Intrusion detection
- ❖ Fault tolerance
- ❖ Integrated intrusion detection/tolerance framework

Causal Chain of Threats



Security Policy


- ❖ Security properties which are to be fulfilled by the system

Confidentiality

Integrity


Availability

- ❖ Rules according to which the system security state may evolve




Security Failure

- ❖ Violation of a security property of intended security policy




Fault Model




- ❖ **attack** - malicious external activity aiming to intentionally violate one or more security properties; an *intrusion* attempt
- ❖ **vulnerability** - a malicious or non-malicious fault, in the requirements, the specification, the design or the configuration of the system, or in the way it is used, that could be exploited to create an *intrusion*
- ❖ **intrusion** - a malicious interaction fault resulting from an *attack* that has been successful in exploiting a *vulnerability*


Fault Model: Recursion




Fault Model: Recursion?



Fault Model: Propagation?



Outsiders or Insiders: Privilege



- ❖ **Theft of privilege:** unauthorized increase in privilege
- ❖ **Abuse of privilege:** improper use of authorized operations
- ❖ **Outsider:** current privilege does not intersect considered domain
- ❖ **Insider:** current privilege intersects considered domain

Dependability Methods

PROVISION

Fault prevention - how to prevent the occurrence or introduction of *faults*

Fault tolerance - how to provide a service capable of or implementing the system function despite *faults*


ASSESSMENT

Fault removal - how to reduce the presence (number, severity) of *faults*




Fault forecasting - how to estimate the presence, creation and consequences of *faults*

Fault avoidance


Fault acceptance



Security Methods

		Attack	Vulnerability	Intrusion
Prevention	<i>how to prevent the occurrence or introduction of...</i>	deterrence, laws, social pressure, secret service...	security policy, semi-formal and formal specification, rigorous design and management...	firewalls, authentication, authorization... (+ attack prevention vulnerability prevention)
Tolerance	<i>how to provide a service capable of or implementing the system function despite...</i>	vulnerability prevention vulnerability removal intrusion tolerance	= intrusion tolerance	confinement,  detection/recovery, masking (eg FRS), + intrusion detection for fault treatment
Removal	<i>how to reduce the presence (number, severity) of...</i>	not applicable	formal proof,  model-checking, inspection, test...	not applicable
Forecasting	<i>how to estimate the creation and consequences of...</i>	intelligence gathering, threat assessment, attack warning...	assess presence of vulnerabilities, exploitation difficulty, potential consequences 	vulnerability forecasting, attack forecasting

Prevention, Tolerance and Removal



Intrusion Detection: Purpose

- ❖ Intrusive behavior => alarms
- ❖ Alarms
 - to a system security officer (SSO), to gather information about attacks, vulnerabilities and intrusions, and possibly to initiate manual countermeasures and/or litigation, retaliation
 - to an automatic countermeasure mechanism in order to avert security failures, i.e., to *tolerate* intrusions
- ❖ *Response* to intrusion is not part of intrusion *detection!*

Intrusion Detection: Definition

[NSA 1998]


" Pertaining to techniques which attempt to detect intrusion into a computer or network by observation of actions, security logs, or audit data. Detection of break-ins or attempts either manually or via software expert systems that operate on logs or other information available on the network "

intrusion detection: concerns the set of practices and mechanisms used towards:


- detection of errors that may lead to security failure
- diagnosing intrusions, vulnerabilities and attacks

intrusion detection system: is an implementation of the practices and mechanisms of intrusion detection


ID Components




ID Topology




Fault Tolerance



Error Detection



Anomaly vs Misuse Detection



Preemptive Error Detection

[Avizienis, Laprie & Randell 2001]

(as opposed to concurrent error detection)

- ❖ Core concepts: AKA "built-in test"
 - > Memory scrubbing
 - > Software rejuvenation
- ❖ Interpretation wrt malicious faults
 - Vulnerability scanning
 - Configuration checking


(Damage assessment)

- ❖ Core concepts: aims to evaluate extent of error propagation before initiating recovery
 - How many checkpoints to rollback?
 - How many processes affected before detection?

- ❖ Interpretation?
 - How many files have been corrupted by an intruder, and thus need to be restored *before use*?

Error Recovery


Backward recovery



Forward recovery




Compensation-based recovery (fault masking)



Error Recovery

- ❖ Backward recovery
 - Operating system re-installation
 - TCP/IP connection resets
 - System reboots and process re-initialisation
 - Software downgrades
- ❖ Forward recovery
 - Automated re-keying procedures
 - Switching to diminished "safe" mode.
 - Software upgrades
- ❖ Masking
 - Voting mechanisms
 - Fragmentation-Redundancy-Scattering
 - Sensor correlation

Fault Tolerance



Fault Diagnosis


- ❖ Core concepts: identification and locations of faults; prerequisite to isolation & reconfiguration
- ❖ **Intrusion diagnosis**, i.e., trying to assess the degree of success of the intruder in terms of system penetration
- ❖ **Vulnerability diagnosis**, i.e., trying to understand the channels through which the intrusion took place so that corrective maintenance can be carried out
(diagnosis immediate if errors signaled by vulnerability scanner or configuration checker)
- ❖ **Attack diagnosis**, i.e., finding out who or what organisation is responsible for the attack in order that appropriate litigation or retaliation may be initiated

Fault Isolation


- ❖ Core concepts: needed to prevent further errors
- ❖ Interpretation wrt intrusions
 - Blocking traffic from an intrusion containment domain that is diagnosed as corrupt, by, for example, changing the settings of firewalls or routers
 - Removing a corrupted file from the system
- ❖ Interpretation wrt root causes (vulnerability/attack)
 - Taking off line software versions with newly-found vulnerabilities
 - Arresting the attacker


System Reconfiguration

- ❖ Core concepts: redeployment of fault-free resources + corrective maintenance
- ❖ Interpretation wrt intrusions
 - Change a voting threshold, e.g., $3/5 \Rightarrow 2/3$ after 2 corruptions
 - Deployment of countermeasures, inc. probes and traps
- ❖ Corrective maintenance actions
 - Vulnerability removal
 - software revision and upgrade
 - security patches
 - Attacker rehabilitation



A (very) Simple Example






Security Properties



Security Properties



Security Properties

Confidentiality


Integrity

Availability


personal data
message content
etc.

identity of person
message origin
sender, receiver identity
existence of operation
etc.


Security Properties




Security Properties




Security Properties



Security Properties




Security Properties






ID Event Generator




- ❖ Target: monitored component
- ❖ Sensor: raw data collector (e.g., sniffer, audit log)
- ❖ Deployment trade-offs
 - Sensitivity: false alarms vs. misses
 - Deployment: ease vs. completeness
 - User rights: privacy vs. visibility
 - Encryption: attacker view vs. system-administration view

ID Event Analysis



- ❖ Successively transform, filter, normalize, and correlate data, adding semantic relevance and reducing volume at each stage
- ❖ Single event analysis box
 - May take its input from several different producers (both from sensor boxes and other event analysis boxes)
 - May feed its output to several different consumers in a topologically arbitrary manner

ID Event Database



- ❖ Provides persistence to IDS
 - Off-line error detection
 - Intrusion analysis
 - Evidence justifying response
- ❖ Text file or relational database
- ❖ Need to be able to view data with varying degrees of resolution